This is a landmark case which held that in a criminal trial, the prosecution has the burden to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt.
Facts of the Case
The Appellant, Reginald Woolmington is 21 years old. He works at a farm. On 14 February 1935, he was convicted for murder of his wife and sentenced to death. He appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal on the ground that the learned judge had misdirected the jury by telling them that in the circumstances of the case he was presumed in law to be guilty of the murder unless he could satisfy the jury that his wife's death was due to an accident.
The appeal came before the Court of Criminal Appeal on 18 March 1935 and was dismissed. The Court said it might be better if the learned judge who tried the case said to the jury that if they accept the appellant’s reasonable doubt, they should either acquit him altogether or convict him of manslaughter only. The Court dismissed the appeal on the basis that there is no substantial miscarriage of justice by relying upon section 4 subsection 1 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907, which provides:
“that the court may, notwithstanding that they are of opinion that the point raised in the appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if they consider that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.”
After that, the Attorney General allowed the appeal to further appeal to the House of Lords because it involved a point of law of exceptional public importance.
The facts are as follows. Appellant’s wife was 17 years old when she was killed. Shortly after having a child, there have been some quarrelling between them and appellant’s wife left him on 22 November 1934 and went to live with her mother. Appellant was anxious to get her back but he did not succeed. The Prosecution proved that about 9.15am on 10 December 1934, Mrs Daisy Brine, the aunt of the appellant’s wife who lives next door was hanging clothes at the back of her house. While doing so, she heard and could recognise the voice of the appellant saying something to the effect “are you going to come back home?” but could not hear the answer. Then, she heard the back door was slammed and a voice in the kitchen. After that, she heard a sound of a gun. She looked out of the front window and saw the appellant went out of the house and left on his bicycle.
According to the appellant’s own story, on the morning of 10 December 1935, he went to work as usual at his employer’s farm. He had the idea that he would take the old gun in the barn and to frighten his wife by telling her that if she did not come back to him, he would commit suicide. He also wrote a suicide note. When he went to the house that his wife is living, he asked his wife to came back but she relied that she was wanted to become a servant. He then threatened that he would shoot himself and went on to show her the gun. The gun somehow when off and his wife was shot. Appellant told the jury that it was a pure accident.
The learned judge when summing up the case to the jury said:
“The killing of a human being is homicide, however he may be killed, and all homicide is presumed to be malicious and murder, unless the contrary appears from circumstances of alleviation, excuse, or justification. ‘In every charge of murder, the fact of killing being first proved, all the circumstances of accident, necessity, or infirmity are to be satisfactorily proved by the prisoner, unless they arise out of the evidence produced against him; for the law presume the fact to have been founded in malice, unless the contrary appeareth.”
Issue of the Case
Whether the appellant’s right to the presumption of innocence had been denied?
Judgment of the Court
What the learned Court said to the jury appears to indicate that when the judge declares that the prosecution had proved his case, the burden of proof shifts to the prisoner to prove that he is not guilty and if the prisoner failed to proof his innocence, the jury must find the prisoner to be guilty.
The Court held that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner and the burden is not laid on the prisoner to prove his innocence or to satisfy the jury of his innocence. It is sufficient for him to raise a doubt as to his guilt. This same proposition had been laid down in Rex v Abramovich [1914] 11 Cr App R 45. Rex v Davies 19 Times LR 350 was correctly stated in the headnote that when intent is an ingredient of a crime, there is no onus on the defendant to prove the act alleged was accidental. The Court then held as follows:
“Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt subject to what I have already said as to the defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory exception. If, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether the prisoner killed the deceased with a malicious intention, the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. No matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained.”
The Court continued to apply this principle to a murder case, as follows:
“When dealing with a murder case the Crown must prove (a) death as the result of a voluntary act of the accused and(b) malice of the accused. It may prove malice either expressly or by implication. For malice maybe implied where death occurs as the result of a voluntary act of the accused which is (i.) intentional and (ii.) unprovoked. When evidence of death and malice has been given (this is a question for the jury) the accused is entitled to show, by evidence or by examination of the circumstances adduced by the Crown that the act on his part which caused death was either unintentional or provoked. If the jury are either satisfied with his explanation or, upon a review of all the evidence, are left in reasonable doubt whether, even if his explanation be not accepted, the act was unintentional or provoked, the prisoner is entitled to be acquitted.”
The Court also declined to apply section 4 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907 because the Court was of the opinion that if the jury had been properly directed by the learned Court, they might not come to the same conclusion. Thus, the Court allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction.
Principle of the Case
The burden of establishing a case in a criminal trial always lies upon the prosecution and the burden of proof shall be beyond reasonable doubt.
The full judgment can be found at the link here.
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